Brief of Political Scientists and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, United States Supreme Court (Nov. 25, 2013) by Forte, David F. et al.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Briefs Faculty Scholarship
11-25-2013
Brief of Political Scientists and Historians as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent, National Labor
Relations Board, Petitioner v. Noel Canning, No.
12-1281, United States Supreme Court (Nov. 25,
2013)
David F. Forte
Cleveland State University, d.forte@csuohio.edu
Hadley P. Arkes
Amherst University
Joseph M. Bessette
Claremont McKenna College
Nelson Lund
George Mason University
Jeremy A. Rabkin
George Mason University
This Briefs and Court Filings is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Law Faculty Briefs by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Case Citation
Hadley P. Arkes, Joseph M. Bessette, David F. Forte, et. al., Brief of Political Scientists and Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, National Labor Relations Board, Petitioner v. Noel Canning, No. 12-1281, United States Supreme Court (Nov. 25, 2013)
See next page for additional authors
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs
Part of the President/Executive Department Commons
Authors
David F. Forte, Hadley P. Arkes, Joseph M. Bessette, Nelson Lund, Jeremy A. Rabkin, and Ralph A. Rossum
This briefs and court filings is available at EngagedScholarship@CSU: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_briefs/13
No. 12-1281 
================================================================ 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
Petitioner,        
v. 
NOEL CANNING, A DIVISION 
OF THE NOEL CORP., 
Respondent.        
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
On Writ Of Certiorari To The 
United States Court Of Appeals 
For The District Of Columbia Circuit 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
BRIEF OF POLITICAL SCIENTISTS 
AND HISTORIANS AS AMICI CURIAE 
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
NELSON LUND 
GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY 
 SCHOOL OF LAW 
3301 Fairfax Drive 
Arlington, Virginia 22201 
AMANDA M. BRUNO 
VANESSA R. BROWN 
MORGAN, LEWIS & 
 BOCKIUS LLP 
1701 Market Street 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
 19103 
ALLYSON N. HO
 Counsel of Record 
JOHN C. SULLIVAN 
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1717 Main Street, Suite 3200 
Dallas, Texas 75201 
214.466.4000 
aho@morganlewis.com 
W. BRAD NES 
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
================================================================ 
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
i 
 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
 
 The Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitu-
tion provides that “[t]he President shall have Power 
to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which 
shall expire at the End of their next Session.” Art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 3.  The questions presented are: 
 1. Whether the President’s recess-appointment 
power may be exercised during a recess that occurs 
within a session of the Senate, or is instead limited to 
recesses that occur between sessions of the Senate. 
 2. Whether the President’s recess-appointment 
power may be exercised to fill vacancies that exist 
during a recess, or is instead limited to vacancies that 
first arose during that recess. 
 3. Whether the President’s recess-appointment 
power may be exercised when the Senate is convening 
every three days in pro-forma sessions. 
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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 Amici are academics, political scientists, and 
historians who focus their work on understanding 
the Constitution of the United States and conveying 
its meaning and underpinnings to students, fellow 
academics, and the courts.1 These amici focus their 
work on the original understanding of the Constitu-
tion at the time of the founding and write books and 
articles that draw attention to that meaning.  This 
allows judges and litigators to wrestle with an under-
standing of the document as adopted—the meaning 
that secures the text’s legitimacy as fundamental law. 
 Hadley P. Arkes is the Edward N. Ney Professor 
of Jurisprudence and American Institutions at Am-
herst University and the Director of The James 
Wilson Institute on Natural Rights and the American 
Founding.  He received his B.A. at the University of 
Illinois and a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.  
Professor Arkes has written numerous books and 
articles addressing the American founding and been 
called upon to testify before Congress on multiple 
occasions. 
 
 1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, the amici submitting this brief and 
their counsel hereby represent that neither the parties to this 
case nor their counsel authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and that no person other than amici paid for or made a mone-
tary contribution toward the preparation or submission of this 
brief.  Amici file this brief with the written consent from all 
parties, copies of which are on file in the Clerk’s Office.  All par-
ties received timely notice of the professors’ intention to file this 
brief. 
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 Joseph M. Bessette is the Alice Tweed Tuohy 
Professor of Government and Ethics at Claremont 
McKenna College.  He has a B.S. from Boston College 
and an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.  
Professor Bessette served as both a Deputy Director 
(1985-1988) and an Acting Director (1988-1990) in the 
U.S. Department of Justice.  His expertise covers the 
Presidency and American Constitutionalism and his 
publications include Executive Power and the Ameri-
can Founding in SEPARATION OF POWERS AND GOOD 
GOVERNMENT (1994) and editing THE PRESIDENCY IN THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: AN HISTORICAL EXAMINATION 
(2010) AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY (2009). 
 David F. Forte is Professor of Law at Cleveland 
State University and the inaugural holder of the 
Charles R. Emrick, Jr.—Calfee Halter & Griswold 
Endowed Chair. He holds a Ph.D. from the University 
of Toronto and a J.D. from Columbia University.  
Professor Forte previously served as chief counsel to 
the United States delegation to the United Nations 
and alternate delegate to the Security Council.  
Professor Forte is widely published in the areas of 
constitutional law and history. He is also Senior 
Editor of THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 
(2006), a clause-by-clause analysis of the Constitution 
of the United States. 
 Nelson Lund is University Professor at George 
Mason University School of Law.  He holds a Ph.D. 
in political science from Harvard University and a 
J.D. from the University of Chicago.  He has pub-
lished widely in the field of constitutional law and 
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constitutional history. Before becoming a professor, he 
served in the United States Department of Justice in 
the Office of the Solicitor General (1985) and the 
Office of Legal Counsel (1986-1987), and as Associate 
Counsel to the President (1989-1992). 
 Jeremy A. Rabkin is Professor of Law at 
George Mason University School of Law.  He gradu-
ated from Cornell University with a B.A. and received 
his Ph.D. from Harvard University.  Professor Rabkin 
serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Institute 
of Peace and is familiar with the appointments pro-
cess; he was originally appointed by President George 
W. Bush in 2007, and then appointed for a second 
term by President Barack Obama and reconfirmed by 
the Senate in 2011.  Professor Rabkin specializes in 
early constitutional history and his articles have 
appeared in major law reviews and political science 
journals. 
 Ralph A. Rossum is the Salvatori Professor of 
Political Philosophy and American Constitutionalism 
at Claremont McKenna College. Professor Rossum 
serves as an editor for many publications and is 
annually recognized in both Who’s Who in America 
and Who’s Who in the World.  He received his B.A. 
(summa cum laude) from Concordia College and 
his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.  
Professor Rossum focuses on the American Founding 
and American Constitutionalism.  He has written 
numerous books and articles on the Constitution, 
including UNDERSTANDING CLARENCE THOMAS: THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL RESTORATION 
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(forthcoming 2014), ANTONIN SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: 
TEXT AND TRADITION (2006), THE AMERICAN FOUNDING: 
POLITICS, STATESMANSHIP, AND THE CONSTITUTION (1981), 
and multiple volumes of the casebook AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
INTRODUCTION AND  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The Recess Appointments Clause does not permit 
the unilateral appointments to the NLRB made by 
the President in this case.  Those appointments—
made during a three-day “intra-session” break when 
the Senate was meeting pro forma—are unique in the 
history of the Republic.  They are also the culmina-
tion of unnecessary and inappropriate Executive 
overreaching.  This overreaching has undermined a 
valuable Senate prerogative in a manner unfathoma-
ble to the Founders and inconsistent with the design 
of the Constitution. 
 The primary purpose of this brief is to show that 
adhering to the original meaning of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause has not and will not disrupt the 
orderly governance of the Nation.  The constitutionally 
prescribed modes of appointment worked perfectly well 
for a very long time, and modern circumstances make 
it even easier to continue using the Constitution’s 
procedures.  Whether the clear text, structure, pur-
pose, and history of the Constitution should give 
way to “practical” considerations of the modern 
5 
administrative state therefore cannot even be consid-
ered an issue in this case. 
 Notwithstanding a few relatively minor deviations 
from the constitutional design, Presidents throughout 
the first 160 years of our Nation’s history largely, and 
certainly without insurmountable difficulties, adhered 
to the textual and structural confines of the Appoint-
ments Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause 
with which it is closely related.  Their ability to abide 
by the Constitution, even in sometimes very difficult 
situations, provides a ready model for exercising the 
Presidential-appointment power today. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in-
vites this Court to sanction an unprecedented expan-
sion of the President’s recess-appointments power.  
The Court should decline that invitation for several 
reasons.2 
 
 2 The D.C. Circuit concluded, primarily for textual reasons, 
that both the vacancy and the appointment must take place 
between the adjournment sine die (signaling the end of a 
Session) and the beginning of the next Session.  Pet. App. 51a-
52a.  The two textual cues on which the D.C. Circuit focused are 
“the Recess”—an apparent singling out of the one “inter-session” 
recess—and “happen”—indicating that the vacancy must also 
come about during the recess.  Amici will not address those 
rulings in detail because the parties (and no doubt other amici) 
will do so extensively. 
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 First, the expansion is impermissible, inter alia, 
because of the importance of maintaining the struc-
tural checks imposed by the general Appointments 
Clause.  Second, historical practice—even consider- 
ing the recent expansion of the President’s recess-
appointment power that has accelerated over the last 
30 years—further illustrates that the appointments 
in question were ultra vires.  Third, comparisons of 
historical and current practice underscore that con-
cerns about the practicality of enforcing the original 
limits on the recess-appointment power—to the 
extent such concerns may even be relevant—are 
entirely misplaced.  Enforcing the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause as written and as the Founders intend-
ed will hardly lead to a crisis in government.  To the 
contrary, Presidents successfully governed under 
those constraints for the bulk of our Nation’s histo-
ry—and, if anything, could more easily do so today. 
 
I. The Structure Of The Constitution Demon-
strates That The President’s Intra-Session 
Recess Appointments Were Unconstitu-
tional 
 The Appointments Clause provides that the Presi-
dent “shall nominate, and, by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint * * * Offi-
cers of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 
2.  The Recess Appointments Clause, in contrast, 
simply allows the President to “fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate.”  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.  The Appointments 
7 
Clause is the rule.  The Recess Appointments Clause 
is the exception.  The exception was used here merely 
to circumvent the rule. 
 
A. The Recess Appointments Clause Must 
Be Read Together With The Appoint-
ments Clause 
 The NLRB’s request for an exceedingly broad 
construction of the Recess Appointments Clause 
focuses extensively on the exception to the rule with-
out confronting the rule itself.  Pet. Br. 7, 19-20.  But 
the Recess Appointments Clause cannot be under-
stood outside the larger context of appointments 
generally.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, 3.  The Recess 
Appointments Clause immediately follows the gen-
eral Appointments Clause in the Constitution as a 
narrow alternative to the generally prescribed meth-
od, not as a separate track for political nominees 
whom the President does not wish to put before the 
Senate. 
 
B. The Appointments Clause Restrains 
The Executive From Exercising Unfet-
tered Power Over Appointments 
 Throughout the Constitutional Convention, the 
Framers sought to provide the government with 
sufficient energy to deal with national concerns, but, 
at the same time, they devised a number of checks 
to limit the possibility of governmental corruption, 
self-dealing, and favoritism.  The Framers showed 
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particular concern with Executive abuses in the ap-
pointments process.  See, e.g., Luther Martin, Genu-
ine Information, MARYLAND GAZETTE, Jan. 29, 1788, 
reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERALISTS: THE 
DEBATE OVER THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 
90 (John P. Kaminski and Richard Leffler eds., 1998) 
(“[T]he person who nominates, will always in reality 
appoint, and that this was giving the president a 
power and influence which together with the other 
powers, bestowed upon him, would place him above 
all restraint and controul.”).  Thus understandably, 
they immediately rejected a proposal during the 
Constitutional Convention to provide the appoint-
ment power to the President alone.  Adam J. White, 
Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and 
Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 HARV. 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 116 (2005) (“First, they voted 
on vesting the appointment power solely in the Exec-
utive.  The motion failed.”). 
 The Appointments Clause alleviated concerns 
over Executive abuse by reining in Executive power 
in appointments.  The Framers settled on a system 
where the President selected officials who were 
nonetheless subject to senatorial confirmation.  Michael 
A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for 
Purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause? 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2204, 2225 (1993) (noting “[t]he Fram-
ers heatedly debated the general power of appoint-
ment” and “voiced great distrust of the executive and 
expressed the need for checks and balances to 
counteract the power of the President”).  Alexander 
9 
Hamilton explained in THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 that 
the purpose of requiring the Senate’s advice and 
consent is that “the necessity of their concurrence 
would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent 
operation” in that it would be “an excellent check 
upon a spirit of favoritism” of the President.  THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 Structurally, appointments were never intended 
to be a unilateral endeavor.  The Constitution ex-
plicitly “confided to the President and Senate jointly” 
the power of appointment.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 
408 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(emphasis in original).  In penning that description, 
Hamilton was responding to Anti-Federalists who 
claimed that the appointment power would lead to 
abuse.  Id. at 405 (“There is hardly any part of the 
system which could have been attended with greater 
difficulty in the arrangement of it than this; and 
there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed 
against with less candor or criticized with less judg-
ment.”).  His goal was to highlight a limitation on 
Executive power.  If the Senate appears to some 
Presidents as “obstructionist” on appointments at 
times, that was the point. 
   
10 
C. The Recess Appointments Clause Is A 
Narrow Exception Originally Designed 
For Temporary Appointments Necessi-
tated By Extremely Lengthy Delays 
Between Congressional Sessions 
 The Recess Appointments Clause was designed 
as a narrow exception to regular appointments to 
address the specific problem of lengthy recesses 
between sessions at the Founding.  Id. at 408 (“[A]s it 
would have been improper to oblige this body to be 
continually in session for the appointment of officers, 
and as vacancies might happen in their recess, * * * 
the succeeding clause is evidently intended to author-
ize the President, singly, to make temporary ap-
pointments ‘during the recess of the Senate, by 
granting commissions which shall expire at the end of 
their next session.’ ” (emphasis in original)).  In the 
early years under the Constitution, the nature of the 
country and the technology of the time made travel 
and communication difficult.  “[I]ntersession recesses 
typically lasted between six and nine months and 
therefore recess appointments were needed to prevent 
important offices from remaining unfilled during 
these long periods.”  Michael B. Rappaport, The 
Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
52 UCLA L. REV. 1487, 1491 (2004) (hereinafter 
Rappaport, Original Meaning). 
 This exception to the appointment process was 
never intended to swallow the rule.  Significantly, the 
Framers adopted the Recess Appointments Clause 
without debate.  Carrier, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 2225. 
11 
In contrast, the general Appointments Clause was 
the subject of intense scrutiny during the public de-
bates over ratification.  Alexander Hamilton responded 
directly to its critics who charged that the President 
had unchecked appointment powers, countering that 
“writers against the Constitution” tend to “misrepre-
sent[ ] ” such powers in order to prey on “the aversion 
of the people to monarchy * * * * ” FEDERALIST NO. 67, 
at 405.  
 Hamilton went on to explain that “[t]he relation 
in which [the Recess Appointments] clause stands to 
the [Appointments Clause], which declares the gen-
eral mode of appointing officers of the United States, 
denotes it to be nothing more than a supplement to 
the other for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary 
method of appointment, in cases to which the general 
method was inadequate.”  Id. at 408 (emphasis add-
ed).  Hamilton made clear that the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause “is to be considered as supplementary” 
to the Appointments Clause.  Ibid. 
 Debates over the Senate’s role in advising and 
consenting to Presidential nominees remained an 
important, unresolved issue even after ratification.  
The First Congress debated vigorously whether the 
President had the power to remove a Presidential 
appointee without the Senate’s consent.  The Senate 
“jealously guarded its prerogatives” and “[m]any 
senators simply assumed that because they consented 
to the appointment of executive officers they likewise 
had to consent to their removal.”  GORDON S. WOOD, 
EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 
12 
1789-1815, 87-88 (2009).  “The Senate was evenly di-
vided on the issue; only after Vice-President Adams’s 
tie-breaking vote did it concede the right of the presi-
dent to remove executive officials without its advice 
and consent.”  Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 In this historical context of vigorous debate over 
the necessity and scope of the general Appointments 
Clause, it is unimaginable that the Framers would 
have enacted the Recess Appointments Clause—
without any debate—while simultaneously intending 
that it provide an enormously broad grant to the 
President to evade the advice-and-consent require-
ment.  That scenario would have run counter to the 
very purpose of the Appointments Clause. 
 
II. The NLRB Appointments Are Fundamen-
tally Inconsistent With Historical Prac-
tice 
 The history of Presidential exercise of the recess-
appointments power does not support the NLRB 
appointments in this case.  Far from it.  Instead, it 
shows a long tradition of virtually uniform adherence 
to the original meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause—with Presidents regularly departing from 
that tradition only over the past 30 years or so. 
 
A. Recess Appointments From 1789-1823: 
Strict Adherence To Original Meaning 
 During the founding era of the Republic, the 
original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
13 
informed by the Appointments Clause, controlled its 
use by the Executive Branch.  Presidents used the 
recess-appointment power to fill vacancies that arose 
during the inter-session recess, and any recess ap-
pointments occurred during that time as well.  This 
was confirmed by the earliest official opinion to be 
offered on the subject. 
 In 1792, the first Attorney General of the United 
States concluded that a vacancy occurred when 
Congress created a new office but that, since the 
vacancy arose during the session of Congress (not the 
recess), it could not be filled with a recess appoint-
ment.  Edmund Randolph, Opinion on Recess Ap-
pointments (July 7, 1792), in 24 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 165-67 (John Catanzariti et al. 
eds., 1990).  The authoritativeness of Randolph’s 
views is only enhanced by the role he played in draft-
ing and ratifying the Constitution.  President Wash-
ington relied upon Randolph’s interpretation in 
making his own appointments, noting that the recess 
appointments he made were for “offices having be-
come vacant since [the Senate’s] last session.”  Exec. 
S. Journal, 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1791); see also id. 
at 38 (1790) (listing vacancies that occurred “during 
the late recess of the Senate”). 
 Alexander Hamilton, too, wrote that “[i]t is clear 
* * * the President cannot fill a vacancy which hap-
pens during a session of the Senate.”  Letter from 
Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry (May 3, 
1799), in 23 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 94 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1976).  This confirmed his 
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previous position that the “auxiliary method of [re-
cess] appointment” was available to the Executive 
only because “it would have been improper to oblige 
[the Senate] to be continually in session for the 
appointment of officers [but] vacancies might happen 
in their recess, which it might be necessary for the 
public service to fill without delay.”  FEDERALIST NO. 
67, at 408 (emphasis in original).  At their inception, 
then, recess appointments were at most a stop-gap 
measure for dealing with narrow circumstances in 
which they are “necessary for the public service.”  As 
the language of the Constitution clearly implies, they 
were not understood to be tools for avoiding the 
advice-and-consent requirement whenever the Presi-
dent found that requirement inconvenient. 
 Indeed, early Presidents viewed Senate confirma-
tion as an integral part of the vetting process itself—
not something to circumvent.  George Washington 
evidenced this in his first nomination after becoming 
President (as recorded in the Senate Executive Jour-
nal): William Short as a temporary replacement for 
Thomas Jefferson as Minister at the Court of France.  
Washington sent a letter to the Senate cordially 
requesting “advice on the propriety of appointing 
[Short]” and offering “papers which [would] acquaint 
[Senate members] with [Short’s] character.”  Exec. S. 
Journal, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1789).  
 And while the Senate regularly consented to 
Washington’s nominations, it was not the “rubber 
stamp” one might imagine.  One of President Wash-
ington’s earliest nominees—Benjamin Fishbourn, 
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nominated for Naval Officer of the Port of Savan-
nah—was rejected by the Senate even though he was 
someone about whom the President felt quite strong-
ly.  See id. at 16-17 (1789).  In keeping with his 
understanding of the joint nature of appointments, 
Washington then sent a letter about Fishbourn, 
suggesting that the Senate permit him to provide 
further information moving forward in situations 
“where the propriety of nominations appear question-
able to you.”  Id. at 16. 
 It is also clear that early Presidents did not use 
recess appointments to by-pass the Senate when 
consent would be lacking.  When it came to recess 
appointments, Washington viewed them merely as a 
temporary measure that, if possible, would be perma-
nently fixed as soon as the Senate was back in ses-
sion.  Thus in informing the Senate of the very first 
set of recess appointments in the Nation’s history, 
President Washington was quick to point out that 
“[t]hese appointments will expire with your present 
session, and indeed ought not to last longer than until 
others can be regularly made.”  Id. at 38 (1790) (em-
phasis added). 
 Between 1789 and 1823, Presidents Washington, 
Adams, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe together 
made well over 4,000 recess appointments.3 The 
 
 3 Unfortunately, it is impossible to compile a complete and 
wholly accurate record of recess appointments before 1965.  See 
generally Carrier, 92 MICH. L. REV. at 2209 n.31.  Between 1789 
and 1823, for example, recess appointments were not recorded in 
(Continued on following page) 
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Recess Appointments Clause was used only to fill 
vacancies that arose during an inter-session recess 
and no appointments were made during intra-session 
adjournments.4 
 The Madison Administration’s use of recess 
appointments is particularly powerful historical 
evidence that enforcing the Recess Appointments 
Clause’s limitations on Executive power will not lead 
to any breakdown in governance.  President Madison 
faced an unprecedented challenge during the War of 
1812—a conflict in which British troops not only 
occupied Washington, D.C., but also burned the 
 
the Senate Executive Journal unless the President chose to 
nominate the recess appointee for a regular appointment once 
the Senate was back in session.  See, e.g., Exec. S. Journal, 2d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1791).  Additionally, in the early years of 
the Republic, the President was occasionally ambiguous in his 
messages to Congress regarding recess appointments.  Thus, 
while there are notices accompanying groups of nominations 
stating that certain recess appointments were made during the 
last recess of the Senate, it is not always clear whether all of the 
nominations in the group were given recess appointments.  See, 
e.g., Exec. S. Journal, 3d Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1794) (“I nominate 
the following persons to fill the offices respectively annexed to 
their names, some of which became vacant during the recess of 
the Senate.”).  
 4 The first intra-session break took place December 23-30, 
1800, during the Second Session of the Sixth Congress. 2012 
Congressional Directory 522.  During that break, President 
Adams made one nomination—Louis Tousard, to be Inspector of 
Artillery—on Christmas Eve, December 24th.  Upon returning, 
the Senate treated it as a December 30th nomination and 
confirmed Tousard on December 31st. Exec. S. Journal, 6th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1800). 
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Executive Mansion and the Capitol.  Nonetheless, 
Madison made all necessary appointments without 
using recess appointments while the Senate was in 
session.  Madison made over 3,000 inter-session 
recess appointments, including more than 2,500 
military appointments and promotions, and handled 
other appointments via advice and consent.  See 
Exec. S. Journal, 11th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1809) 
through 18th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1817).  Madison’s 
example confirms that even under extraordinary 
circumstances, enforcing the original meaning of the 
Recess Appointments Clause is entirely consistent 
with the Executive’s responding effectively to complex 
and demanding challenges. 
 
B. Recess Appointments From 1823-1921: 
Positions Vacated Before The Recess 
1. Rise Of The “Happen to Exist” Con-
struction 
 The first shift away from the original meaning of 
the Recess Appointment Clause came in 1823 with an 
opinion by Attorney General William Wirt.  Wirt was 
tasked with addressing when a vacancy must “hap-
pen” to come under the Recess Appointments Clause.  
From a textual standpoint, he admitted that the 
vacancy should “arise” during the recess.  His opinion, 
however, was based on what he thought was required 
by the “reason and spirit” of the Constitution—and he 
concluded that the vacancy could be one that “hap-
pen[ed] to exist” during the recess.  Executive Author-
ity to Fill Vacancies, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 632 (1823) 
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(hereinafter Wirt Op.).  In Wirt’s view, the vacancy 
could potentially arise at any point before the recess 
and still be eligible for Executive appointment with-
out Senate confirmation—a perfect contradiction of 
Attorney General Randolph’s opinion just 30 years 
earlier. 
 In the century after this first interpretive stretch-
ing of the Recess Appointments Clause, thousands of 
recess appointments were made to fill vacancies that 
occurred both during and before the recess of the Sen-
ate.  Importantly, however, the recess-appointment 
power was still not used—with two notable excep-
tions discussed in the next section—to make ap-
pointments during intra-session adjournments.  
 In reality, though, it is unclear that the “happen 
to exist” interpretation offered by General Wirt was 
widely accepted over the “happen to arise” interpreta-
tion that previously governed.  It appears to have 
been a disputed issue both at that time and for at 
least another century.  For example, just two years 
after Wirt’s opinion, the Senate considered a resolu-
tion: 
That the President of the United States does 
not, constitutionally, possess either the right 
or the power to appoint ambassadors, or oth-
er public ministers, but with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, except when vacancies 
may happen in the recess. 
Exec. S. Journal, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 467 (1825).  
The resolution’s language is close to the text of the 
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Recess Appointments Clause itself, but the use of 
“when vacancies may happen in the recess” (as 
opposed to “all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess”) arguably points to the Senate continuing to 
subscribe to the “happen to arise” construction. 
 Further evidence of the disputed nature of Gen-
eral Wirt’s interpretation may be seen in the first 
version of 5 U.S.C. § 5503—the statute limiting the 
conditions under which recess appointees may be 
paid—that was passed in 1863.  The limitations it 
enforces make it “appear[ ]  that this statute was 
enacted based on the Senate’s view that the Constitu-
tion adopted the arise interpretation.”  Rappaport, 
Original Meaning, at 1543 n.173.  A Senate report 
from that same Congress also defended the “arise” 
view.  Ibid.  As recently as 1940, Congress was still 
using this statute to implicitly rebut the presumption 
that recess appointments could be made to fill vacan-
cies that occurred during a session of the Senate.  
Michael B. Rappaport, Why Nonoriginalism Does Not 
Justify Departing from the Original Meaning of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 
(www.ssrn.com) (forthcoming late 2013) (hereinafter 
Rappaport, Nonoriginalism).  Additionally, key 
Attorney General opinions throughout the Nine-
teenth Century and court cases in the 1860s strongly 
support the original “happen to arise” construction.  
Ibid. 
 Structurally, the shift from “happen to arise” 
to “happen to exist” may be less problematic than 
the Executive’s later claim of a power to make 
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intra-session recess appointments.  See Part II.C. 
infra. General Wirt argued that the “substantial 
purpose of the [C]onstitution was to keep these offices 
filled; and powers adequate to this purpose were 
intended to be conveyed.”  Wirt Op. 632.  True enough, 
but the Constitution was designed to protect the 
people from dubious appointments, not just to keep 
offices filled with whomever a President most prefers.  
That is why the Recess Appointments Clause was 
written to protect the normal advice-and-consent 
requirement of the Appointments Clause.  
 That said, Wirt’s “happen to exist” interpretation 
at least seems to involve less of a purposeful dodge of 
Senate confirmation than making recess appoint-
ments while the Senate is still very much in session.  
Nevertheless, straying from the constitutional text in 
this respect only made it that much easier for later 
Presidents to expand the recess-appointment power 
well beyond textual, structural, and historical 
bounds—culminating in the unprecedented appoint-
ments at issue in this case. 
 
2. Continued Rejection Of Intra-Session 
Recess Appointments 
 Even while the meaning of “happen” was being 
debated, recess appointments continued to be made 
only during inter-session recesses.  The two excep-
tions that prove the rule also occurred during this 
period. 
21 
 First are President Johnson’s 1867-1868 recess 
appointments during extended intra-session breaks of 
the Senate.  Although Johnson’s appointments run 
contrary to the text, original meaning, and purpose of 
the Clause, they should be viewed as anomalies 
rather than any sort of general shift in the separation- 
of-powers firmament.  Indeed, they are sui generis in 
the first 130 years of the Republic. 
 In 1867, Congress was in session from March 4th 
until December 1st but took a two-and-a-half month 
break from late April to early July and a four-month 
break from late July to late November.  Congress 
followed a similar schedule the next year, taking 
several longer intra-session breaks.  Before that time, 
however, Congress had only taken eleven intra-
session breaks of more than three days in the entire 
history of the Nation.  Each break occurred around 
Christmas time and none was longer than a few 
weeks. 
 The “intra-session” breaks taken by the 40th 
Congress likely appeared to President Johnson as 
actual recesses of the Senate.  Indeed, the first of the 
lengthy intra-session adjournments began when a 
Special Session, called during April of 1867, ad-
journed sine die, the normal signal for the end of a 
congressional session.  Additionally, after Johnson’s 
impeachment and trial in 1868, the president pro 
tempore used language to begin an adjournment that 
sounded like the language normally used to end a 
session.  Rappaport, Nonoriginalism. 
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 This also explains Johnson’s actions with regard 
to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.  Indeed, one of 
the articles on which President Johnson was im-
peached dealt with his treatment of Stanton.  See 
Article I, Proceedings of the Senate Sitting for the 
Trial of Andrew Johnson.5 President Johnson sus-
pended Stanton during Congress’s second long ad-
journment of 1867.  But according to a provision of 
the Tenure of Office Act—a law designed specifically 
to protect Stanton—the President could only suspend 
cabinet members without congressional approval 
when Congress was out of session.  Tenure of Office 
Act, 14 Stat. 430 (1867).  Johnson later removed 
Stanton from office so that he could challenge the 
constitutionality of the Act.  Although the second long 
break in 1867 did not begin with “session-ending” 
language, Johnson’s actions—i.e., suspending Stanton 
and recess-appointing William Gould as paymaster of 
the Army—may simply signal that Johnson viewed 
the unusual breaks taking place during those years 
as inter-session recesses.6  
 
 5 Available at http://www.nps.gov/anjo/historyculture/article-i. 
htm. 
 6 Johnson made the appointment during the second long 
break without reference to the adjournment being intra-session.  
The Court of Claims later held that Gould had been validly ap-
pointed during what it called an intra-session recess.  Gould v. 
United States, 19 Ct. Cl. 593 (1884).  That language, however, 
was admittedly dicta, id. at 596, and Attorney General Knox 
later concluded that Gould’s appointment should not be taken 
as precedential.  President—Appointment of Officers—Holiday 
Recess, 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599, 602-03 (1901). 
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 Perhaps the strongest reason for treating John-
son’s recess appointments as anomalous is that there 
is no indication that anyone debated the constitution-
ality of the appointments at that time—and that is 
striking when one considers the hostilities that were 
taking place between Congress and the President. 
 The unusual nature of President Johnson’s 
appointments was not addressed until 30 years later 
when Attorney General Philander Knox considered 
the question of intra-session recess appointments in 
1901.  He stated simply that “[t]he public circum-
stances surrounding [the 1867-1868] state of affairs 
were unusual and involved results which should not 
be viewed as precedents.”  23 Op. Att’y Gen. at 603.  
In General Knox’s view, the appointments were 
contrary to both “the uniform practice of the Execu-
tive and the various opinions of [his] predecessors.”  
Ibid.  General Knox highlighted the difference in the 
Constitution between “the Recess” and an intra-
session “adjournment” in setting forth the “irresistible” 
conclusion that “the President is not authorized” to 
make an intra-session appointment.  Id. at 604.  
Furthermore, he confirmed that “[a]ny immediate 
temporary adjournment is not [a constitutional] 
recess, although it may be a recess in the general and 
ordinary use of that term.”  Id. at 601. 
 The second set of exceptions that prove the rule 
are President Theodore Roosevelt’s on December 7, 
1903.  The Senate ended a special session that day 
and then immediately began a regular session.  
President Roosevelt caused a good deal of controversy 
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by claiming that the very short period of time be-
tween the two sessions amounted to a “constructive 
recess” and making recess appointments based on 
that assumption.  The Infinitesimal Recess, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1903, at 8.  His actions prompted the 
Senate Judiciary Committee to prepare a report on 
what constitutes a recess of the Senate in which it 
soundly rejected any notion of a “constructive recess.”  
S. Rep. No. 4389, 58th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in 39 
Cong. Rec. 3823, 3824 (1905).  It is not only the 
immediate backlash to his actions, though, that show 
how political actors interpreted the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause at that time.  It is also the fact that 
President Roosevelt at least evidenced a regard for 
the understood meaning of the rule in his formalistic 
attempt to dodge the textual mandate by styling the 
break as a “constructive recess.”  One thing remained 
clear: intra-session recess appointments were anath-
ema. 
 
C. Recess Appointments From 1921-2012: 
The Executive’s Shift Toward Intra-
Session Recess Appointments 
 After 132 years of settled opinion on the matter, 
Attorney General Harry Daughtery adopted a novel 
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in 
1921, advocating a “practical” interpretation of “re-
cess.”  Contrary to General Knox’s earlier opinion, 
Daughtery interpreted the 1905 Senate report to 
conclude that advice and consent need not be ob-
tained when the Senate is “absent so that it cannot 
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receive communications from the President or partic-
ipate as a body in making appointments.”  Executive 
Power—Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 
25 (1921).  While the Senate had appeared to indicate 
that functional inability to respond to the President 
was a necessary condition for a recess, Daughtery 
appeared to take it as a sufficient one.  Thus for the 
first time in the Nation’s history, there was a legal 
opinion suggesting Presidents might make “intra-
session recess appointments” if the Senate took an 
extended break.7 
 But with the exception of President Harding’s 
four appointments in reliance on the Daughtery 
opinion, the practice of recess appointments did not 
change significantly until many years later.8  
 
 7 It is possible that Daughtery may actually have been 
arguing for a “modified intersession” recess in which any 
lengthy period during which the Senate cannot offer advice and 
consent becomes a functional intersession recess.  Understand-
ing those long breaks as legitimate recesses, much as it seems 
President Johnson interpreted Congress’s actions in 1867-1868, 
would be supported by the length that the recess appointee 
stayed in office.  In the years following Daughtery’s opinion, the 
recess appointment would only last until the end of the session 
when the Senate returned, not the end of some future session.  
This lends credence to the idea that both the Executive Branch 
and Congress viewed these “intra-session” appointments, Pet. 
Br. at 9a-12a, as “inter-session” even though there was no sine 
die adjournment.  Rappaport, Nonoriginalism.  
 8 Even Daughtery concluded that no one would think a two- 
or three-day adjournment constituted a practical recess.  In fact, 
he thought a break of even five to ten days would probably not 
meet the “practical” test he invented.  33 Op. Att’y Gen. at 25. 
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 In 1928, President Coolidge did appoint John 
Esch as commissioner of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission during a 13-day recess.9 Notably, the 
Senate rejected Esch’s nomination during the follow-
ing session and his commission ended at the end of 
the formal session—an indication that the adjourn-
ment during which Esch was appointed was treated 
as an inter-session recess.  Clarence A. Miller, The 
Interstate Commerce Commissioners: The First Fifty 
Years: 1887-1937, 5 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 580, 665 
(1936). 
 Thus from 1789 to the 1940s, there were virtual-
ly no intra-session recess appointments, and the few 
that were made each had unusual facts: (1) Johnson’s 
during the controversies of 1867-1868; (2) Harding’s 
short appointments in 1921 that were quickly con-
firmed; and (3) Coolidge’s appointment of Esch and 
Hoover’s promotions and appointments, which appear 
to have been viewed as inter-session appointments. 
 It was not until 1947 that Presidents began 
making intra-session recess appointments with more 
regularity.  President Truman made 20 recess ap-
pointments over four intra-session adjournments.  
 
 9 Several officers received promotions—technically these 
are new appointments—under President Hoover, and he also 
made some appointments to the Federal Farm Board in 1929.  
These appointments, however, took place during a special 
Executive-called session and so might also have been considered 
to be outside the normal session of Congress.  If so, it was 
functionally an inter-session recess. 
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President Eisenhower followed his lead, making nine 
appointments during intra-session adjournments.  
President Nixon made eight such appointments, 
President Carter made 17, and President Reagan 
made 73.  Presidents since Reagan have made intra-
session recess appointments with more or less fre-
quency.  
 Importantly, however, there has been no congres-
sional acquiescence in this practice.  On the contrary, 
Congress has attempted to rein in Presidents’ ultra 
vires exercise of the recess-appointment power by 
taking such steps as limiting the circumstances under 
which appointees get paid and using pro forma ses-
sions to block appointments.  On the whole, the 
Senate appears zealous—and indeed part of Petition-
ers’ argument is that the Senate is too zealous—to 
guard its advice and consent role. 
 In 1823, Attorney General Wirt—who presided 
over the first expansion of the Clause—speculated 
that the exception would swallow the rule only if one 
“imput[ed] to the President a degree of turpitude 
entirely inconsistent with the character which his 
office implies.”  Wirt Op. 634.  Wirt was mistaken.  
The acceleration in intra-session recess appointments 
over the last 30 years shows the need, instead, to 
heed Madison’s admonition: “If men were angels, no 
government would be necessary * * * * [But] in fram-
ing a government which is to be administered by men 
over men, the great difficulty lies in * * * oblig[ing] it 
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to control itself.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 The appointments at issue here—made during 
pro forma sessions of the Senate—although unprece-
dented, are nonetheless symptomatic of the expan-
sion of the recess-appointments power that has 
primarily occurred over the past 30 years.  Seizing 
upon the language of the Daughtery opinion, the 
Office of Legal Counsel informed President Obama 
in early 2012 that “the convening of periodic pro 
forma sessions in which no business is to be conduct-
ed does not have the legal effect of interrupting an 
intrasession recess otherwise long enough to qualify 
as a ‘Recess of the Senate’ under the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause.”  Lawfulness of Recess Appointments 
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding 
Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, ___ Op. O.L.C. ___, 
2012 WL 168645, at *19 (Jan. 6, 2012) (hereinafter 
OLC Memo).  
 Pro forma sessions have been historically under-
stood to defeat recess appointments.  Henry B. 
Hogue, Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Ques-
tions, Congressional Research Service, 10 (Jan. 9, 
2012) (noting the Senate’s use of its power to “deter-
mine the Rules of its Proceedings”—under Article I, 
§ 5, clause 2 of the Constitution—to conduct 
pro forma sessions that would frustrate President 
George W. Bush’s use of the recess-appointments 
power).  Congress is in session and, therefore, neither 
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chamber can be absent for more than three days 
without the consent of the other.10 
 Acting on the advice of the OLC Memo, President 
Obama made recess appointments during one of the 
three-day pro forma sessions.  Thus for the first time 
in the Nation’s history, a President made intra-
session recess appointments even though the Senate 
was “in session” in a manner that made the members 
of Congress believe the Adjournments Clause was 
satisfied. 
 
III. History Confirms That Adhering To The 
Original Meaning Of The Recess Ap-
pointments Clause Is No Barrier To Good 
Governance 
 This Court has repeatedly explained that the 
original meaning of the Constitution at the time of 
ratification is the guide for its interpretation today.  
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634-35 
(2008) (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the 
scope they were understood to have when the people 
adopted them.”); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 
U.S. 657, 721 (1838) (recognizing that the meaning of 
 
 10 In this instance, Senate leaders asked the House to 
prevent the appointments by not agreeing to the Senate’s 
adjournment.  This did not allow for an amount of time to pass 
that would traditionally be understood as long enough to count 
as a functional recess.  Pet. Br. 56.  The appointments here were 
thus unprecedented even under Petitioners’ theory of recess 
appointments. 
30 
the Constitution “must necessarily depend on the 
words of the constitution [and] the meaning and 
intention of the convention which framed and pro-
posed it for adoption and ratification to the conven-
tions * * * in the several states”). 
 Some have objected, however, that fidelity to 
original meaning must yield to the exigencies of a 
changing world.  See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE 
LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).  In the instant case, 
however, that debate is beside the point.  If anything, 
it is even easier today for the Executive to operate 
within the constitutional constraints imposed by the 
Founders than it was in earlier times.  Even then, 
Presidents managed to govern effectively within 
those constraints—sometimes under trying circum-
stances, as discussed above.  And not a single one of 
the Executive departures from the Constitution’s 
requirements can plausibly be seen as necessary for 
the public good. 
 To be sure, in the modern administrative state, 
the number of political appointments requiring Sen-
ate confirmation has increased.  But at the Founding, 
too, Presidents were responsible for an exceedingly 
large number of appointments—and still managed to 
make them when the Senate was in session (under 
the Appointments Clause) or between sessions when 
a vacancy arose (under the Recess Appointments 
Clause).  President Washington, for example, ap-
pointed numerous ensigns and other low-level officers 
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with which a modern President is not concerned.11 
The process was streamlined for Washington by the 
Secretary of War presenting Washington with long 
lists of officer nominations that could then be offered 
to the Senate for consideration without much effort.  
Even so, the appointments were not left solely to 
Executive Branch discretion—not all of the stream-
lined nominations were approved.  See Part II.A. 
supra. 
 To allow modern Presidents to do an end-run 
around the original meaning of the Appointments 
Clause (and thus to evade its constraints) threatens 
the very dangers that concerned the Founders and 
that consumed the ratification debates.  And it is 
unnecessary besides.  If anything, there is even less 
reason today than at the Founding to be concerned 
with the workability of enforcing the limits reasonably 
imposed by the Founders on the President’s recess-
appointment power. 
 First and foremost, it is simply much easier in 
our time to convene the Senate.  Today’s Senate 
meets regularly and can reconvene on very short 
notice if necessary.  Furthermore, the Secretary of the 
Senate can receive messages concerning nominations 
from the President at any point during a Congress 
and deal with them appropriately.  See, e.g., 149 
Cong. Rec. S8 (Jan. 7, 2003).  If it was unnecessary 
 
 11 See 10 U.S.C. § 624 (allowing O1-O3 commissions to 
operate outside the advice and consent of the Senate). 
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for President Adams to recess appoint his nominee 
during the first intra-session break in the Senate’s 
history—when the Senate could not be called upon for 
advice and consent—it is unnecessary for a modern 
nomination to be forced through when the Senate 
could be called upon to act.  The nominee can easily 
be considered upon the Senate’s return.  See note 4 
supra. 
 Second, the Senate’s vetting process can be 
expedited considerably in the modern age because 
candidates can be available by telephone or email in 
an instant, and can usually interview in person 
almost immediately.  Nominations must simply be 
made far enough in advance to ensure a hearing 
while the Senate is in session (or non-controversial 
enough to be expedited quickly near the end of a 
session).  Indeed, the current Administration has 
already selected a nominee to fill a U.S. District 
Court position in Maryland even though that position 
will not be vacant until February of next year.12 But 
vacancies can languish for extended periods before 
the President makes a selection for the office.  On 
average, a modern President will take 5 to 6 
months to make a nomination; some positions wait 
for a nominee for 15 months or more.  Rappaport, 
 
 12 See Press Release, White House, President Obama Nom-
inates Two to Serve on the United States District Courts (Sept. 
25, 2013) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
2013/09/25/president-obama-nominates-two-serve-united-states- 
district-courts). 
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Nonoriginalism, at 13-14.  This contrasts with early 
Presidents working to prevent gaps—even to the 
point of obtaining pre-recess advice and consent for 
individuals uninformed of their own nomination.  
With advance planning, the Senate could be called 
upon to expedite appointments once again.13 
 Third, individuals may be appointed—with the 
consent of Congress—to serve temporarily in a posi-
tion if the need is urgent.  Federal Vacancies Reform 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3345 (2012).  Someone from within the 
department can occupy a vacancy for a short time 
until an actual appointment is made.  In this way, 
Congress allows for the government to continue 
operating even in emergency or unforeseeable situa-
tions—and Presidents can keep offices filled whatever 
the Senate’s reasons are for not confirming nominees.14 
 
 13 Further evidence is the Senate’s recent decision to 
disallow filibusters for Presidential nominations except to this 
Court.  THE WASHINGTON POST, “Reid, Democrats trigger ‘nucle-
ar’ option; eliminate most filibusters on nominees,” available  
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-poised-to-limit- 
filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/ 
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html. 
Whatever the merits or ramifications of that decision, it shows 
that the political branches have room to maneuver within 
constitutional confines when it comes to appointments. 
 14 For example, President Obama has already filled 560 
vacancies using the Act.  See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
Federal Vacancies Submissions, http://www.gao.gov/legal/ 
fedvac/searchcurr.html (search by administration to locate 
specific results). 
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 That Congress did not provide for acting NLRB 
members, see 5 U.S.C. § 3349c(1)(a), cannot, of 
course, justify departing from the original meaning of 
the Recess Appointments Clause.  If anything, it only 
confirms that Congress can, when it chooses, act to 
streamline the appointments process.  After all, other 
multi-member bodies have received congressional 
approval for the appointment of acting members.  
Congressional inaction with respect to the NLRB, in 
particular, implies that Congress viewed the advice 
and consent requirement for that body as of higher 
importance than the “need” to fill spots on the Board.  
Given the highly political nature of the NLRB, it is 
unsurprising that Congress would want to ensure 
that its members were subject to Senate approval. 
 Today, it is difficult to conceive of any emergency 
that would necessitate an intra-session appointment.  
And this is true even if the Senate were prevented, 
for some reason, from reconvening or considering 
a nominee for a few days.  Suppose a sudden death 
presented a vacancy in the armed services or in 
the ranks of an agency that needed to act in a 
time-sensitive manner.  A successor from within the 
ranks—as a temporary or acting appointment— 
could be appointed to ensure the continuity of the 
organization.  The reality, however, is that the recess-
appointments power has been used (inappropriately) 
to by-pass the advice-and-consent requirement to fill 
vacancies that have been open for months or even 
years—belying any argument that an expansive 
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interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause is 
necessary to prevent a breakdown in governance.  
 In sum, if President Madison could keep vacan-
cies filled during the War of 1812 when a foreign 
power captured the capital (and burned much of it) 
without resort to intra-session recess appointments, 
today’s Presidents can certainly do the same.  Not 
only is the original meaning of the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause practicably enforceable today, but the 
concerns about executive irresponsibility that moti-
vated the Framers have hardly faded into oblivion.  
 Consider the events now infamously known as 
the Saturday Night Massacre.  On October 20, 1973, 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson and Deputy 
Attorney General William Ruckelshaus both resigned 
rather than carrying out President Nixon’s order to 
fire independent special prosecutor Archibald Cox.  
Richardson and Ruckelshaus had given assurances to 
the House Judiciary Committee that they would not 
interfere with Cox’s work.  More specifically, Richard-
son promised the Senate—in his confirmation hear-
ings—that he would only fire the special prosecutor 
for malfeasance in office.  That sort of oversight of 
appointments thus played a direct and substantial 
role in the events that unfolded—and the absence of 
such oversight, which always occurs with recess 
appointments, might have retarded the unraveling of 
the Watergate scandal. 
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 Thus to whatever extent enforcing fidelity to the 
original meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause 
would require changing current practice, the Found-
ers would likely view such changes as entirely salu-
tary.  And they would be right.  The Constitution was 
not designed to make life as easy as possible for 
Presidents.  The fact that Presidents in the last few 
decades have tried to read the Constitution to in-
crease their own power does not make it so. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals should be affirmed. 
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